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A B S T R A C T
Due to the many advantages offered by the cloud computing paradigm, it is fast becoming
an enabling technology for many organizations, and even individual users. Flexibility and
availability are two of the most important features that promote the wide spread adoption
of this technology. In cloud-based data storage scenarios, where the data is controlled by
a third party (i.e. the cloud service provider), the data owner usually does not have full
control of its data at all stages. Consequently, this poses a prime security threat, and amajor
challenge is the development of a secure protocol for data storage, sharing, and retrieval. In
recent years, a number of research works have targeted this problem. In this paper, we
discuss some of the major approaches for secure data sharing in the cloud computing
environment. The goal is to provide a concise survey of existing solutions, discuss their
benefits, and point out any shortcomings for future research. Specifically, we focus on the
use of encryption schemes, and provide a comparative study of themajor schemes, through
implementation of some representative frameworks.
c⃝ 2015 Qassim University. Production and Hosting by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).l1. Introduction
In recent years, interest in cloud computing has gained con-
siderable momentum. Cloud computing is centered on the
notion of “services”, which are independently developed and
deployed artifacts to which clients subscribe on per need
basis, and pay the service providers based on their us-
age. A service can formally be defined as a set of related
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manipulated over the Web using a set of (XML-based) stan-
dards. Many organizations are using cloud based systems to
store their data and important information. Apple’s “iCloud”
is a prime example where each user is granted a space on
the cloud to store his/her data and retrieve it whenever, and
where ever (i.e. using a number of devices in potentially dif-
ferent geographical locations) needed. Data security in this
sevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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want their data to be secured not only on the cloud but also
when uploading the data, retrieving the data when the data
is used by some Web services to answer the queries. In this
regard, a major threat is when a third party may monitor the
connections between the services or between the user and
the services to obtain access to confidential data. However,
threats do not only come from a third party monitoring the
connections, but sometimes the cloud service provider itself
is not a trusted party. In this case we have to protect the data
that is on the cloud from the cloud service provider also not
only during retrieval but the problem is when we want to an-
swer queries using the uploaded data.
To prevent the above mentioned forms of security
challenges, a number of research works have been proposed
and various techniques for secure data exchange have been
developed. However, most of the existing research works
focus on some aspects of the problem, and comprehensive
solutions seldom exist. Moreover, a number of these solutions
have weaknesses like the efficiency of the algorithm. For
instance, the schemes for querying over encrypted data
ensure that the cloud service provider is not a threat any
more, however, such schemes are not efficient.
To see what scheme suits best as a solution of the prob-
lem we need to have some evaluation criteria to compare the
available encryption mechanisms. This will also help in fig-
uring out what is needed to be added (if needed) to the best
scheme or mechanism we get as a result of the comparison.
The following are the evaluation requirements to be consid-
ered for the schemes:
1. Data confidentiality: Any unauthorized party (including
the cloud server) should not learn any information about
the encrypted data files.
2. Fine-grained access control: For users in the same group
or different groups, each user can be associated with
different access rights which will make the scheme more
reliable and efficient as a real life solution.
3. Scalability: The system should have the ability to work
efficiently even when the number of authorized user
increases.
4. User accountability: When an authorized user becomes
dishonest and shares his/her attribute private key with
some unauthorized users, he/she should be held account-
able.
5. User revocation: If a user quits the system, the user’s ac-
cess rights should be revoked, and the user is denied ac-
cess to the data. This should be done without effecting
other users or needing to change the keys.
6. User rejoin: This refers to the ability of getting the user
back into the system after revocation, without effecting
other users or keys.
7. Collusion resistant: The system’s users should not be able
to combine their attributes to decrypt the encrypted data
files.
8. Ciphertext size: This refers to the size of the generated
file after running the encryption algorithm on the original
plaintext data file.
In the following, we provide an overview of some of the
most prevalent methods proposed for secure data exchange.
These methods are reviewed according to the solution
requirements mentioned above.2. Overview of encryption schemes
In this section we provide a brief overview of some encryption
schemes used in cloud data confidentiality management. A
number of variants of the following security schemes have
been proposed, i.e., most works implement some of these
encryption techniques and/or are based on them.
2.1. AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
AES is a Symmetric Key Cryptography algorithm that converts
the data files from plaintext format into an incomprehensible
format that is called ciphertext which cannot be read by hu-
mans to prevent the unauthorized users from gaining access
to the data files [1]. In AES, encryption and decryption use the
same key which converts e.g. a 128 bit data block to the same
size of encrypted content. The key size can be adjusted on per
need basis. AES has four main operations/functions: SubByte
scrambles each data byte, ShiftRows scrambles the data rows,
MixColumns scrambles each data column, and AddRoundKey
does the encryption [2].
The approach taken by Prabhakar and Joseph [3] is repre-
sentative of AES that protects the data for the entire lifecy-
cle from the beginning to the end in the cloud environment.
The approach uses AES-256 for encryption along with SSL
(Secure Socket Layer) for the sharing and transfer part. The
data owner encrypts the data with AES symmetric key en-
cryption to provide data security and then uploads the data
to the cloud using SSL. The proposed scheme [3] is claimed to
be structured to provide complete security for the data dur-
ing all stages. It is divided into two phases. Phase one deals
with data encryption and secure upload to the cloud. Phase
two has to do with the data retrieval which includes authen-
tication process by the data owner and by the cloud service
provider and decryption. In the first phase, users register with
the data owner so they have the ability to sort and retrieve
data files. Authentication process is used here to check for
valid users. When the user is authenticated, then that user
is provided with a secret key and decryption key. The data
owner in this phase also encrypts the data using AES-256 en-
cryption scheme. The encryption is done iteratively and this
iteration is based on the encryption key. SSL is then used to
protect the data files during the transfer to the cloud. In the
second phase, to access the data the user must be authenti-
cated, using a username/password scheme. When authenti-
cated, the user then sends a request to the cloud server. The
cloud server verifies the user details and starts the process of
data retrieval. When the user receives the data then the data
is decrypted in iterations similar to how it was encrypted. The
AES encryption scheme protects the data from tampering and
for the decryption AES is also used since it is very difficult
to guess the key. Since the data remains encrypted and the
cloud provider has no knowledge of the key, data confiden-
tiality is guaranteed. For Brute force attacks or exhaustive key
searches AES provides ample protection also. However, a ma-
jor drawback is efficiency and privacy protection.
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In Homomorphic encryption, the plaintext is manipulated
with algebraic manipulation like multiplication and addition.
These operations behave in a consistent way which means
the plaintext is changed according to operations in the cipher-
text. This type of encryption is central, and has been in exis-
tence since the advent of public key cryptography [4]. There
are some known encryption schemes that fall under the ho-
momorphic encryption paradigm such as RSA [5] and Paillier
[6]. These schemes are half homomorphic (i.e., support only
one operation: either multiplication or addition). Fully homo-
morphic encryption (FHE) schemes support both operations,
i.e. multiplication and addition to the data. In [7] a scheme
to perform algebraic query processing over encrypted data is
proposed. The proposed scheme is intended to protect the
data during all stages of the sharing process based on FHE.
It consists of an Evaluate algorithm, KeyGen, Encrypt and de-
crypt algorithms. Since operators that are normally used in
database computation do not work over encrypted data, the
paper introduces an extension to the data model. Suppose
that a table called R (is in plaintext) with A columns. The
scheme represents this as (R′, pk) where pk is the encryption
public key, and then the table is defined as R′(A,p) with all
of A and one more column p which takes the value 0 or 1 to
represent the presence of the row in the table. The scheme
also provides algorithms for the database operators to work
on the encrypted table R′; with bitwise operators, arithmetic
and comparison operators, operations on a bit and a word
and also implementation for relational algebra. The purpose
of these operators is to allow the service providers to perform
database operations and get the results while the data is still
encrypted. For returning the results to the client, the system
cannot simply send the whole result table, as this might be a
very large data block. A proposed solution states that the user
can specify an estimation of the number of the rows in the
output table. The cloud server then sends the output accord-
ing to the specified number where the sent output has the
highest probability of being in the result of the query. This ap-
proach can result in a query estimation and not sending the
exact query result. The proposed scheme provides an alter-
native solution by a two-step process for sending the results
to the client. In the first step, the service provider computes
the sum of the columns of the p value in the result table and
this number is sent to the client. The client then decrypts the
number (lets call the decrypted number n) then he/she de-
cides on how many rows are needed in the result and asks
the service provider for n′ rows in the result table. The ser-
vice provider then sorts the rows of the result on the p while
trying to maintain the other order if the query specifies a cer-
tain order. The service provider then sends the top n′ rows
and the client verifies the sum p that should be equal to the
sum n. This process provides exact query result to the client.
However, a number of issues in the proposed approach are
left unanswered, such as practicality of FHE, building indexes,
and user authentication.2.3. Attribute Based Encryption
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) proposed in 2005 contains
three main tenants: authority, data owner and data end users
(consumers) [8]. Each party has assigned roles in the system.
The authority is responsible of generating keys for the data
owners and end users to encrypt and decrypt the data files
according to certain attributes. The data owner encrypts the
data using the keys generated by the authority. The users use
their assigned private keys to decrypt the data files in which
they are authorized to do so. The attributes of the user trying
to decrypt a file are checked and matched with the attributes
in the ciphertext. If they do not match, the user is not allowed
to decrypt the files even if he/she has the appropriate key.
A secure multi-owner data sharing scheme that supports
dynamic groups efficiency where the size and computation
overhead of encryption are independent of the number of
revoked users is presented in [9]. The focus of the work is
to enable sharing data in a multi-owner manner while still
preserve data privacy and identity privacy even in untrusted
clouds. One basic solution is encrypting the data files and
then upload the encrypted data into the cloud. However, this
is not entirely practical, due to identity privacy and since
any member in the group should be able to manipulate or
store the data, and be able to use the services in the cloud.
Another reason is that groups are usually dynamic, i.e., users
or members in the group change from time to time. These
membership changes make it more difficult to secure data
sharing. Several approaches or schemes have been proposed
for secure data sharing but in these schemes one user stores
the encrypted data and distributes the decryption key to
the rest of the group members. The problem arises here as
the number of data owners and revoked users increase. The
technique presented in [9] is able to share and store data files
in the cloud, the complexity of encryption is independent of
the number of revoked users, user revocation can be done
without the need to update the private key for the other users,
and a new group member can decrypt stored files directly.
Group Signatures are also supported that allow any member
of the group to sign messages while keeping the identity
secret and it can be revealed by the group manager. Similarly,
dynamic broadcast encryption enables the broadcaster to
transmit the encrypted data to the users such that only a set
of authorized users can decrypt this data. This scheme also
allows the group administrator to dynamically add or remove
group members while keeping the same old information like
the decryption keys and does not need to recompute the keys.
The cloud is operated by cloud service providers (CSP) and
provides web services. This entity is not fully trusted by cloud
users because usually CSP is not a group member or out of
the users’ trusted domain. The group manager is in charge of
the system and controls system parameters, user registration,
user revocation and revealing the identity of data owner.
The group manager is fully trusted entity. Group members
are the set of the registered users that use the cloud and
register their data into the cloud server and share them with
the group. To be able to achieve a secure data sharing for
the dynamic groups in the cloud, Mona combines the group
signature and dynamic broadcast encryption techniques. The
group signature enables users to anonymously use the cloud
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owners to share their data in a secure manner. The group
manager is responsible for system initialization. To register
a user the group manager randomly selects a number and
registers the user according to a known equation [9]. For the
user revocation the group manager has a public revocation
list that is based on which group members can encrypt their
data files and ensure the confidentiality against the revoked
users.
Taeho Jung et al. proposed an encryption scheme based
on ABE that provides anonymous privilege control to address
the user identity privacy issues [10]. Similarly, a novel patient-
centric framework and a suite of mechanisms for data access
control in Personal Health Records (PHR) stored in semi-
trusted servers is proposed in [11]. The scheme considers a
PHR system with multiple PHR owners and users. The owners
in this case are the patients and the users are a variety of
people like friends or researchers. The scheme supposes the
cloud server to be semi-trusted i.e. the server will fetch for
secret information in the PHR but follows a general protocol.
The problem arises if some users collude with the server
to get the information. Another assumption is that each
party in the system is preloaded with the public/private key
pair. The main idea behind the framework is to divide the
system into multiple security domains according to different
user’s data access requirements. These domains are named
public domains and personal domains. The public domains
consist of users who have access to the data based on their
professional role such as doctors. The personal domains
contain users that are associated with the data owner such
as family and these gain access rights assigned by the data
owner. In both domains, ABE is utilized. The system is noticed
to have some limitations for practicality of using ABE andMA-
ABE in building PHR systems so a suggestion for future work
is to use ABBE (Attribute-Based Broadcast Encryption) scheme
to try in resolving the issue. Another thing is the expressibility
of the encryptor’s access policy is limited by MA-ABE since it
only supports conjunctive policies across multiple AAs. The
authors believe that there might be a need to use distributed
ABE scheme and that might resolve the issue.
A one-to-many (one uploader and several retrievers) en-
cryption system is presented in [12]. The encrypted data file
can be decrypted by more than one authorized user or recip-
ient. The ABE-based scheme supports monotonic access for-
mulas that contain AND, OR, or threshold gates. The paper
proposes a hierarchical identity based architecture in cloud
computing to embody the user hierarchy in the secure cloud
storage services sharing. The root private key generator (PKG)
delegates the upper level user as the lower level PKG and the
use of this is generating the secret keys for all low level users.
The secret key transmission is done in a domain for the users
to guarantee secure transmission. The sender needs to en-
crypt the file once only and store just one copy of the ci-
phertext in a cloud that communicate with no users. This
cloud is used by the other users to recover the files using
their private keys. The scheme is constructed using bilinear
map and is presented using five algorithms. (1) RootSetup:
given a large security parameter, the root runs BDH (Bilinear
Diffie–Hellman) [13] parameter generator to generate a prime
number and 2 groups and then chooses a random numberfrom the first group and chooses 2 cryptography hashes and
sets the parameters. (2) DomSetup: is used to generate the
secret keys for a certain user by taking the public key as pa-
rameter. (3) One2ManyEnc: this is the encryption algorithm
that is used to transfer the plaintext into ciphertext such that
multiple users can encrypt the data files using their keys.
(4) UserDec: this is the decryption algorithm that is used to
recover the file by the user given the ciphertext. (5) Recipients-
Dec: this is the decryption algorithmwhich transforms the ci-
phertext back to plaintext. The thing missing in the scheme is
the idea to enable lower-level users to send a short trapdoor
to a CSP before retrieving the files. This should prevent in-
formation leakage during the transmission process. Yu et al.
proposed a scheme based on CP-ABE (Ciphertext-Policy At-
tribute Based Encryption) to provide the authority with the
ability to revoke the attributes of the system users with min-
imal effort [14]. To resolve the flexibility and scalability issues
in ABE schemes, Pandian et al. proposed a scheme based on
CP-ABE in 2013 that also provides fine-grained access control
for cloud applications [15]. Similarly, Goyal et al. proposed a
scheme for secure sharing and storage of cloud data based on
KP-ABE (Key Policy ABE) [12].
2.4. Proxy re-encryption
Proxy re-encryption was proposed in 1998 by Bluemer, Blaze
and Strauss to enable re-encryption of some ciphertext
encrypted by one user such that another user will be able to
decrypt it [16]. Usually it is used on top of ABE schemes. One
of the applications in which proxy re-encryption is useful is
when some user wants to forward some encrypted data to
another user without the need of key forwarding.
Samanthula et al. proposed a data sharing scheme that is
both secure and efficient based on Homomorphic encryption
combined with proxy re-encryption [17]. Their main contri-
butions can be summarized as follows. Efficient user revoca-
tion: the revocation of the user does not require re-encrypting
all the data or new key distribution, Efficient and secure re-
join for revoked users: in the case a revoked user wants to
rejoin the system either with the same access rights or dif-
ferent access rights, all the data owner needs to do is regis-
tering the entry just like registering a new user, preventing
collusion between users and CSP: the encrypted data and au-
thorization token list can be outsourced to separate CSPs and
hence prevents any collusion between the users and CSP, and
Preventing collusion between a revoked user and authorized
users: the authorized users can only decrypt the data files in
which they are given access rights from the data owner. The
proposed framework is a generic scheme where any method
in the homomorphic encryption or proxy re-encryption
schemes is applicable. The framework consists of five steps
as follows: (1) Key Generation and Distribution: here the data
owner generates and distributes two types of key pairs based
on homomorphic encryption and distributes these keys to the
system users. The data owner also generates the proxy re-
encryption key for each authorized user. (2) Data Outsourc-
ing: In this stage, the data owner encrypts the data files
and generates authorizing tokens for each data file. The next
step is uploading the data files to the cloud. (3) Data Access:
upon data access request, the CSP checks whether the user is
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ingly. (4) User Revocation: the data owner performs the ac-
tions required for secure revocation of certain user’s access
rights. (5) User Rejoin: the data owner generates a new au-
thorization token with the desired access rights to the user.
The scheme assumes that the user can collude with at most
one of the clouds in the system. So for each data record the
data owner exports a ciphertext and a list of pairs of proxy
re-encryption keys and the corresponding userID for all au-
thorized users to the first cloud denoted as primary cloud and
also pairs of the users and ciphertext to the secondary cloud.
During the data access, the users send the request to the pri-
mary cloud and the cloud does some verification and then
sends the request to the secondary cloud that will, in turn, do
the homomorphic operations and send the result to the user.
So according to the assumption that the user can collude only
with one cloud, the collusion will not affect the system and
will be useless.
2.5. Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption
Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption (HIBE) is an encryption
scheme that is used to restrict users who are unauthorized
or partially authorized and might share their key with some
unauthorized users which will lead to unauthorized data ac-
cess. Major works in this regard include [18,19], and [20]. HIBE
consists of five main steps or operations: Setup generates the
public parameters and the master secret, Encrypt takes the
plaintext, the public parameter and the set of identities and
outputs the ciphertext which is the encrypted content, Key-
Gen generates the secret key for the provided identity vector
w. Decrypt restores the ciphertext into its original plaintext
content, and Delegate outputs the secret key for w′ which is a
concatenation of the identity vector w.
In 2011, Wang, Liu, and Wu aimed to propose a scheme
that achieves finegrained access control with a high per-
formance, full key delegation and flexibility. Their proposed
approach combines both HIBE (Hierarchical Identity Based
Encryption) with CP-ABE (Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based
Encryption) [21]. The scenario in which the proposed system
is based is a company where the company owner uploads the
data on the cloud server and the employees retrieve the data
from that server. The scheme has multiple keys and each keyhas a different usage purpose. These keys and their usage are
summarized in the table [21] (see Fig. 1).
The proposed scheme consists of seven algorithms with
polynomial run-time. Setup: this algorithm takes a large
number of security parameters (k) as input and then outputs
system parameters and the root master key MK0. CreateDM:
this algorithm is used to generate the Master keys for the
DMs by using params and the master key. CreateSK: this al-
gorithm is used to generate the private key for the user using
param and the master key if and only if the user is eligible.
If not, then it will output “NULL”. CreateUser: this algorithm
generates the secret key of the userID as well as the user at-
tribute secret key. Encrypt: this is the encryption algorithm
to transfer the message from plaintext to ciphertext. RDe-
crypt: this is the decryption algorithm that decrypts the ci-
phertext to original plaintext message using the user’s private
key if the userID belongs to the recipients set. ADecrypt: this
is another decryption algorithm that depends on the users at-
tributes (whether they satisfy the jth conjunctive clause in the
attribute based access control policy). The scheme is proved
to be secure and at the same time collusion resistant. How-
ever, an open issue in the scheme or something for future
scheme enhancement is implementing more expressive en-
cryption scheme so we can have full security under standard
model but enhance the performance of the scheme.
In 2013, Dong et al. proposed “SECO” [22] which is a secure
and efficient collaboration scheme based on HIBE to ensure
the data confidentiality on the untrusted clouds. The scheme
employs a two-level HIBE to ensure the confidentiality of the
data files in untrusted clouds. The proposed scheme is con-
sidered the first attempt to explore the secure data collabora-
tion service which prevents leakage and enables one-to-many
encryption. It also enables data writing operation and fine-
grained access control. SECO realizes one-to-many encryp-
tion paradigm such that the encrypted domain data can have
many authorized users that are able to decrypt the data files.
The private key generator (PKG) manages a number of D-PKGs
(domain private key generator) while D-PKG manages a num-
ber of domain users. The data owner encrypts the data with
multiple users in the domain using the public key and stores
the data on the cloud server. Users outside the recipients list
will not be able to decrypt the data or even learn any informa-
tion from the data files. The following is the set of algorithms
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The R-PKG (root private key generator) takes a security pa-
rameter K as input and outputs the system parameters a root
master key. Domain Setup: Each D-PKG obtains the system
parameters from the R-PKG and randomly picks a master key
that will be used to generate the private keys for the domain
users. Key Generator: R-PKG uses its master key to generate
private keys for D-PKGs while D-PKGs use the system param-
eters and their secret keys to generate the private keys for all
domain users. Encryption: The data owner inputs the system
parameters, plaintext message and ID-tuples of the intended
data authorized users to generate the ciphertext. Decryption:
The user or D-PKG inputs the system parameters, ciphertext
and the private key to recover the original plaintext data from
the encrypted data file.
2.6. Identity Based Broadcast Encryption (IBBE)
One of the earliest works on Broadcast Encryption was pre-
sented by Naor and Fiat in 1994 [23]. In Broadcast Encryption,
the data broadcaster encrypts the data file and sends it to a
group of users. These users then use their private keys to de-
crypt the message. The broadcaster selects a set of identities
at the encryption step, so that only the intended users are
able to decrypt the transmitted file(s). This encryption scheme
is collusion resistant [24]. An example of an efficient and
secure data sharing technique based on Identity Based Broad-
cast Encryption (IBBE) and Public key Encryption with Key-
word Search (PKES) is presented in [25]. The construction has
a two layered access control on shared encrypted data. In the
first layer, there are two mechanisms provided which are de-
fined for authorization and revocation, so each user will be
able to get a private key to perform search and decryption.
Moreover, if the user’s key is revoked, it will not be able to read
and search the data. The second layer provides an identity
based access control mechanism, so that users will be able
to upload encrypted data and submit a set of identities along
with it such that the users in the set are the only users who
have access to the data. The construction also provides a key-
word based search so that authorized users can use their pri-
vate keys to generate queries. The scheme consists of seven
algorithms. A brief overview follows. Let U be the user Identity
universe and M be the message, then we have the following
algorithms:
• Setup(λ,n): executed by the authority. Input is λ which is
a security parameter and n is number of system users.
Outputs the master key MK and the public key PK.SKSIG
• Extract(MK, IDi): executed by the authority. Input is MK
and IDi which represents the identity that is when
receiving private key request on it, the algorithm will
output the user’s private key SKi.
• Encrypt(S,M,W): executed by the data owner. Input is S
which is the set of authorized users,M is the message and
W is the set of keywords. Output is the encrypted content
CT (ciphertext).
• Query(SKi, IDi,W): executed by the user. Input is the user’s
private key SKi, user’s identity IDi and the keyword W.
Output is the user’s query Qi,w.• Trapdoor(MK, Qi,w): executed by the trusted private cloud.
Input is master key MK, user’s query Qi,w. Output is the
trapdoor TPi,w.
• Test(CT, TPi,w): executed by the public cloud server to
search the matched ciphertext. Input is the encrypted
content CT and the trapdoor. Output is yes or no where
yes means that the trapdoor matches the ciphertext.
• Decrypt (PK, SKi,S,hdr, CM): executed by the user. Input
is the public key PK, the user’s private key SKi and the
returned ciphertext (S,hdr, CM). Output is the original
message M in plaintext.
In the initialization stage, the authorized party runs the
Setup algorithm to get the public key and the master key.
Then in the data upload stage, any authorized user will be
able to submit the set S along with the encrypted data. In this
stage, the user runs the Encrypt algorithm to encrypt the data
prior to uploading. In the new user grant stage, a new user
needs to apply to get the private key and uses the Extract
algorithm. During the Data Access stage, the user runs the
Query algorithm to generate the query. Upon receiving the
query, the trusted private cloud runs the Trapdoor algorithm
to generate the trapdoor TP which is then used for the
Test algorithm that tests the ciphertext CT and returns the
matched ones to the user. Finally, the Decrypt algorithm is
used to convert the ciphertext back to the original plaintext
message. As for the performance of the method, some stages
take constant time regardless of the number of the system
users like the initialization stage, but there are some stages
that take more time as the number of the users increase.
However, in the existing analyses of the scheme, both the
verification and decryption are not considered.
3. Other solutions
Some other techniques to address the security issues in cloud
data sharing have also been proposed. Some of these provide
their own encryption mechanisms like the solution proposed
in [26] which enables authorized users to perform keyword-
based search directly without sharing the secret key. The
proposed solution provides two layered access control to limit
unauthorized access to the shared data. It assumes a trusted
private cloud and public cloud in the system. Moreover, the
system construction does not rely on shared keys. Major
features are summarized below:
• Two-Layered Access Control: is performed on the shared
encrypted data. The first layer takes care of the autho-
rization and revocation mechanisms, where each user
obtains an individual private key for searching and decryp-
tion. The second layer provides an identity based access
control mechanism where the users are allowed to submit
identities along with uploading the encrypted data.
• Keyword-Based Search: is performed only by authorized
users that are able to use their private keys to generate
the queries.
The scheme may seem similar to other prevalent schemes
algorithmically. However, some differences at various stages
can be noted. An overview of the specific steps or phases
of operations performed by the scheme, and associated
algorithms follow.
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run the setup algorithm to obtain the keys. The difference
here between this scheme and other schemes is that the
setup algorithm used to initialize the system generates the
PK and MK like the previous ones but MK here consists of
two parts MKIBBE and MKPEKS. PK will be published where
the two parts of MK will not.
• Data Upload: This step is the data upload phase where the
data owner will run encrypt algorithm to encrypt the data
prior to uploading the files to the cloud.
• New user Grant: The new user will apply to the authority
for the private key and the authority will run Extract
algorithm using MK and the user ID. Again this scheme
will divide the key SK into two parts SKIBBE and SKSIG.
• Data Access: In the current approach, this step is a bit
more complex than the previous ones. The user will run
the Query algorithm to generate the query and send it
to the cloud. When the cloud gets the query, the server
will run the Trapdoor algorithm using SKPEKS part of the
key to generate a trapdoor that will then be used in the
Test algorithm that performs tests on the ciphertexts and
returns the matched ones to the user. The user then needs
to decrypt the ciphertext to get the original message.
• User Revocation: For user revocation, just the correspond-
ing registration information is deleted.
Another class of solutions provide a software on the
client’s side that handles transferring the data securely. A
prime example is that proposed in [27] which is a new ar-
chitecture for secure applications in which the only software
running on the end host is a light-weight secure thin termi-
nal, and most application logic resides at a remote cloud ren-
dering engine. The scheme uses the enduser’s workstation as
a secure I/O path to access application logic in the cloud. This
allows for a radically client-side platform so the client-side
STT (Secure Thin Terminal) needs only to render graphical
data from a remote application and forward input events to it.
The STT is isolated from the user’s untrusted operating sys-
tem through a small layer that is called microvisor. A cloud
rendering engine CRE executes an application that produces
a bitmap image to appear on the user’s screen and then sent
to the STT over an encrypted protocol.
The approach centers on two abstractions: the STT on the
client side and the CRE on the cloud server. The STT is a
software that runs on the user’s workstation to provide secure
access to a remote application, without the need of trust in
any other software on the workstation. The CRE is the server
side counterpart of the STT and it contains almost all the
functionality of the application and runs an isolated instance
of the application for each STT on a separate virtual machine.
These virtual machines run a minimal software stack needed
to render the remote application rather than allowing the
user to install his/her own software.
The main problem with such solutions is the need of
installing the software on the client’s workstation and trying
to find an alternative solution that is cloud-based. This is
extra work for the clients who want to use the solution and at
the same time it limits the range of the supported devices.
Another proposed solution uses PaaS (Privacy as a service)
to solve the problem of processing sensitive data in cloud
infrastructures securely [28]. The main goal of the design ofPasS is to maximize the user control in managing the various
aspects related to the privacy of the sensitive data files.
This goal is achieved by implementing a user-configurable
software and data privacy categorization mechanism. The
scheme also provides the users with feedbacks on the
operations performed on their data files.
The proposed scheme relies on cryptographic co-proce-
ssors to provide isolated secure processing containers. The
co-processor is a piece of hardware card that interfaces
with the server through PCI-based interface. The crypto co-
processor resists physical attacks because of the tamper-
proof casing that encloses it. The organizational unit is
responsible of crypto co-processor configuration and distribu-
tion to the cloud service providers. It needs to be installed on
every server running a virtual machine for the users that are
registered in the privacy service. The system user is respon-
sible of configuring his/her software applications to support
security mechanisms enforced by the service. It is possible to
run the application in a secure co-processor without applying
software divisions, but doing so will affect the performance
and efficiency of the application. Prior to uploading the data
to the cloud server to be stored and processed, the user needs
to classify the data based on sensitivity and significance into
the following categories:
1. NP (No Privacy): the data files that are not sensitive, i.e. in
which the cloud service provider is fully trusted to store
the data with no encryption.
2. PTP (Privacy with Trusted Provider): the service provider is
trusted to encrypt the data files.
3. PNTP (Privacy with NON-Trusted Provider): the user
encrypts the data files prior to uploading them to the cloud
server.
The scheme also has three privacy protocols that are:
• Data and Software Transfer Protocol.
• Software Execution and Data Processing Protocol.
• Privacy Feedback Protocol.
A major drawback of the proposed scheme is its reliance
on a hardware piece that needs to be installed on the
server for the scheme to function, thereby minimizing the
practicality of the solution.
4. XACML for cloud data security
XACML is a markup language that is based on XML and used
to enforce access control. It is an OASIS framework that spec-
ifies and enforces the rules for the access control. There are
some extended versions of XACML that provide easy to use
data sharing that is secure, flexible and scalable [29]. XACML
became a standard that is used for enforcing the access con-
trol and the extended versions are providing fine grained
access control [30]. Since it is based on XML, it is easy for
humans to read and understand it, and it follows the well-
formed XML rules. Khadilkar et al. addressed the data shar-
ing issue in their paper [31] by combining cloud computing
technologies with XACML policy based security mechanisms
to provide fine-grained access control to cloud resources. The
following is a description of their system layers and compo-
nents:
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in which the cloud users access the infrastructure. This
application provides an authentication mechanism as a
login page that uses Java Simplified Encryption to store the
usernames and passwords in a file that is not accessible to
any user.
• The ZQL parser layer: this layer takes any query submitted
by the user and if no error is returned, it proceeds to the
XACML policy evaluator. This parser is an SQL parser that
is written in JAVA.
• XACML policy layer: this layer is divided into subsections
that are defined for the framework. XACML Policy Builder
defines role based access control policies on the resources
by defining a mapping in the query between users and the
query type. Moreover, the policy evaluator is used during
query execution and also during view creation.
• Basic query rewriting layer: this layer enables adding
another abstraction layer between the user and HiveQL by
allowing the user to input SQL queries that are rewritten
in HiveQL syntax.
• Hive layer: this is the data warehouse that is built on top
of Hadoop and provides the ability to structure the data in
HDFS as well as the query.
• Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) Layer: this is a
distribute file system designed to run on basic hardware
and stores data files according to tables created in Hive.
The systemwas implemented on a 19 node cluster with amix
of two different configurations for nodes. The experiments
used two data sets to test the systems performance versus
Hive.
The proposed method suffered from the lack of some
keyword based groups such as UPDATE and DELETE. Another
issue with it is that it needed to be extended to public
clouds. Anh et al. also proposed an XACML based scheme to
support secure and flexible data sharing framework for cloud
that extends XACML model by integrating flexible access
control decisions in [30]. They demonstrated the need of a
secure flexible data sharing scheme, extending the XACML
framework to support fine-grained policies and implemented
a prototype of the framework providing a user friendly
user interface and evaluating the prototype’s performance.
Their proposed prototype needed some improvements such
as minimizing the number of data servers, support stream
databases and continuous queries and most importantly
providing more fine-grained access control by relaxing the
trust assumptions.
5. Logging and auditing
Encryption schemes (as the ones mentioned above) usually
do not offer user accountability [32]. In these cases, some
form of logging or auditing mechanism is needed. Auditing
schemes usually consist of two main components: the logger
and the log harmonizer. The logger records the system log
in a file (e.g. JAR) and the log harmonizer is responsible of
providing the log files to the system manager/data owner,
to take further actions if needed [33]. The following is an
example of a scheme that clarifies the auditing and logging
mechanism.The Cloud Information Accountability (CIA) system [34]
performs automated logging and distributed auditing for rel-
evant access that are performed by entities in the cloud sys-
tem. This is supposed to add more security to the cloud
infrastructure. The CIA consists of two major components,
these are the logger an log harmonizer. A JAR file contains a
set of rules for access control to specify the authority of each
party in the data access. The integrity of JRE on the system
is also going to be checked on which the logger is initiated
via oblivious hashing. The scheme converts the JAR file into
obfuscated code for more infrastructure security. The main
problem here is when the cloud asks for user’s personal and
confidential data that are sometimes necessary to perform a
certain task. This data need to be secured from sharing with
a third unauthorized party. The issue here is not sharing the
data only but also at certain points both the data owner and
the cloud service provider might loose control over the data
while the data is processed in a chain of interaction between
parties. The system design is as follows. JAR Generation: This
JAR file contains the set of access roles. The JAR file provides
usage control to perform logging based on the configuration
settings that were defined at the creation time. Obfuscation:
Obfuscation in software development refers to creating ob-
fuscated code deliberately that is the machine language that
cannot be read by humans. This is used to avoid tampering
and reverse engineering to get the source code. The code is
generated using obfuscator that are programs to convert the
code into obfuscated code. Logging Mechanism: The JAR file
is responsible of handling authentication of entities which
want to access the data. Log Record Generation: Log records
are generated using the logger component. Logs are generated
whenever some party tries to access the data and these logs
are appended to the JAR file. Provable Data Possession (PDP):
The PDP system can be generated in two phases, setup and
challenge. This provides security and catches different kinds
of attacks. Auditing Mechanism: Data owners will get a fre-
quent update of the access record to their data. Accountabil-
ity Mechanism: After the log file is sent to the data owner by
the log harmonizer, the data owner can then check the log file
and take appropriate actions. Open Issues include adding the
JRE verification mechanism to the scheme and enhancing the
PDP architecture at the user-end to allow an efficient usage
for the PDP.
Another scheme that conducts automated logging and dis-
tributed auditing of relevant access performed by entities in
the system was proposed in [35]. The enhancement in this
scheme compared to previous versions is taking concern of
the JAR file by converting it into obfuscated code to add more
security to the infrastructure. The scheme’s idea is similar to
previous ones in the way it functions with just a little modi-
fication done to it. The main components of the scheme are
also the same, and these are the logger and the log harmo-
nizer which perform the same operations performed by pre-
vious schemes. The main difference or modification that was
done is converting the JAR file to obfuscated code to add more
security to the framework infrastructure. The schemewas im-
plemented by setting up a small cloud and the test environ-
ment consisted of several Open SSL-enabled servers.
Although that the proposed scheme improved the security
of existing schemes that perform automated logging, the
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scheme still has the same problem (like the existing ones) of
having a mechanism to verify the integrity of the JRE and the
suggested solution up to the time this paper was written is
to leverage the advantage of secure JVM that is developed by
IBM. Another is enhancing the PDP architecture from the user
side to allow efficient system usage.
6. Experiments
A number of schemes have been proposed for secure cloud
data sharing. In this section we present a brief comparison
of some of the encryption schemes discussed earlier. We ran
the proposed schemes on a small application (JAVA-based) for
comparison purposes. The application takes plaintext files as
input and provides encrypted files along with the encryption
time as output. The computer used on the execution was a
mac running OS X on 2.5 GHz Intel core i5 processor and 8 GB
1600 MHz DDR3 Memory. In these experiments we provided
some files with different sizes to be encrypted using different
encryption schemes. The code has a timer that gives the exact
time from right after reading the file until right before starting
the writing (this period is where the encryption process
happens). We performed repeated tests to get averages and
to eliminate errors. One of the main things we got out from
the experiments other than the encryption performance is
the size of the encrypted file after getting the ciphertext from
the plaintext file. This is an important parameter since the
larger the file, the more the overhead.
The comparison between some of the major available en-
cryption schemes according to the evaluation criteria dis-
cussed earlier is shown in Fig. 6. The table compares the
schemes based on the security requirements mentioned
above as well as the encryption time complexity, which is the
time, needed to encrypt the file where X indicates the exis-
tence of the criteria and x indicates the absence of it. ACT
is the attributes associated with the data, G1 and G2 are two
bilinear groups of prime order p. In FHE, t is the security pa-
rameter. In HIBE l is the levels of the Hierarchy and T is Time
Slices. Ciphertext size in the table refers to the size of the file
that is generated as a result of running the encryption process
on the plaintext (input file) (see Fig. 2).
Figs. 3 through 6 show the performance of encrypting the
files using the mentioned encryption schemes:Fig. 3 – Performance of homomorphic encryption.
Fig. 4 – Performance of attribute based encryption.
We can clearly see from the figures that AES starts with a
very short encryption time but as the file size grows, the time
increases rapidly. We can thus concluded and that AES works
best with small input files. For Homomorphic Encryption, it
starts with a higher timing than AES for small files, but then at
larger files it gives the results faster than AES which makes it
better for large files in terms of performance. Attribute Based
Encryption, as can be seen from the figure is affected by the
number of attributes associated with the file to be encrypted.
As the number of attributes grows, the time needed for
encryption also increases. Similarly, for Hierarchical Based
Encryption the file size gives approximately a linear increase
in the encryption time, but it is mostly affected by the number
of the levels in the hierarchy.
7. Conclusion
Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm, and security is the
most important factor in cloud data sharing since in many
cases the data being shared is sensitive and unauthorized
access might be harmful to the data owner. This requires
finding a secure data sharing scheme to deploy in the
environment where the data is being shared. Many schemes
have been proposed in the literature depending on encryption
mechanisms to provide data security. In this paper, we have
presented a survey of major secure data sharing schemes for
the cloud environment. The focus of the survey is to show
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provide it. ** Since same key is used for Encryption/Decryption. *** Since attributes are added to the encrypted content then
the size will grow depending on the number of attributes. + Need to Encrypt again removing the user ID. So has encryption
overhead.how encryption is used in each of the covered technique,
and to discuss the corresponding open issues (if any). The
brief survey also provides a comparison to make discussion
clear. From the comparison table we could infer that the best
schemes (schemes that cover themost security requirements)
are Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) and Hierarchical
Attribute Based Encryption (HABE). In our future work, we aim
to propose a scheme that will contain the security features in
these while overcoming any deficiencies/open issues in them.
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